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Administrative Prerequisites to Litigation Under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964-Recent
Developments
James S. Bukes*
INTRODUCTION
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was enacted with the
following purpose: "The purpose of this title is to eliminate, through
the utilization of formal and informal remedial procedures, discrim-
ination in employment based on race, color, religion, or national
origin. The title authorizes the establishment of a Federal Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission and delegates to it the pri-
mary responsibility for preventing and eliminating unlawful em-
ployment practices as defined in the title."' "Sex" was added later
as a basis of discrimination by an amendment proposed by Repre-
sentative Smith of Virginia.'
The structure of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
sion is modeled after the National Labor Relations Board. The in-
vestigative powers of the Commission are similar to those of the
National Labor Relations Board. For example, the subpoena powers
found in Section 11 of the National Labor Relations Act are incorpo-
rated into Title VII.3
However, unlike the Labor Board, the Commission has no author-
ity to issue cease and desist orders. Cease and desist powers were
considered, both prior to enactment of the 1964 act4 and prior to the
* A.B., University of Pittsburgh; J.D., University of Pittsburgh; General Attorney, Char-
lotte Office, EEOC.
1. H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. [hereinafter cited as H.R. Rep. No. 914],
reprinted in [1964] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2391, 2401 and EEOC, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
OF TITLES VII AND XI OF CnIIL RIGHTS AcT OF 1964, at 2026 [hereinafter cited as EEOC].
2. See 110 CONG. REc. 2577 (1964) and EEOC, supra note 1, at 3213 (reprinting Congres-
sional Debate by Subject Matter).
3. The Commission is composed of five members, not more than three of whom shall be
members of the same political party. Members of the Commission are appointed by the
President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, for a term of five years. 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-4(a) (1976). See 29 U.S.C. § 161 (1976) for the text of § 11 of the National Labor
Relations Act. These subpoena powers are incorporated into title VII by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-9
(1976).
4. H.R. REP. No. 914, supra note 1, at 2426.
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enactment of the 1972 amendments to the Act,5 but, after much
debate, those powers were not given to the Commission. Under the
present statutory scheme, the Commission investigates each charge
and if it finds reasonable cause to believe that a charge is true, the
Commission must then engage in conciliation discussions; if those
discussions are unsuccessful, the Commission may litigate the
charge.6 Powers of litigation were granted to the Commission by the
1972 amendments; prior to that time the Commission had no powers
of litigation and the charging party was forced to file his own lawsuit
in federal district court if conciliation discussions were unsuccessful.
Since the 1972 amendments, the Commission has litigated only a
small percentage of the charges upon which reasonable cause is
found, and, therefore, the charging party is often forced to retain
private counsel if he wishes to proceed after failure of conciliation.
Case law is still unsettled in many areas due to the relatively
recent enactment date of the amendments.' An area which has
caused a great volume of litigation is with respect to prerequisites
to litigation under the Act. The statutory requisites (post 1972
amendment) are as follows: "Charges shall be in writing under oath
or affirmation and shall contain such information and be in such
form as the Commission requires. ' '8 Section 706(e) of the Act re-
quires that a charge be filed within 180 days after the alleged unlaw-
ful employment practice occurred, unless the aggrieved person has
originally instituted proceedings with a state or local agency with
the authority to grant or seek relief. In that case, the federal charge
may be filed within 300 days after the alliged unlawful employment
practice occurred, or within 30 days after receiving notice that the
state or local agency has terminated the proceedings under state or
local law, whichever is earlier. Additionally, no charge may be filed
by the person aggrieved prior to the expiration of 60 days after
proceedings have been commenced under the state or local Fair
Employment Practice Law, unless such proceedings have been ear-
5. BUREAU OF NATONAL AFFAIRS, THE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY AcT OF 1972, at 55
(1973).
6. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1976).
7. Sections 703, 704, 706 and 707 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 became effective on July
2, 1964. Act of July 2, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 716(b), 78 Stat. 266. The 1972 amendments
to section 706, enacted on March 24, 1972, were made applicable to all charges pending with
the Commission on the date of enactment, as well as to all charges filed after that date. Equal
Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-26, § 14, 86 Stat. 113.
8. 42 U.S.C. 99 2000e-5(b) and (e) (1976).
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lier terminated.' Furthermore, the Commission is required to serve
notice of the charge upon the respondent employer within ten days
after filing of the charge. 0 Charging party shall be issued notice of
right to sue within 180 days from filing of the charge if the Commis-
sion has not filed a civil action or obtained a conciliation agreement
and charging party may file in the federal district court within 90
days after notice is given."
The requisites delineated in the preceding paragraph are the only
statutory prerequisites to litigation set out in the Act and apply to
all charges filed by aggrieved parties against covered respondent
employers, labor organizations and employment agencies. The ex-
perience of the federal courts in interpreting the aforesaid sections
of the Act differs considerably from that which a literal reading of
the Act would lead one to expect.
CONTENTS OF CHARGE REQUIREMENTS
Bringing a charge before the EEOC is a jurisdictional prerequisite
to the filing of a suit for Title VII violations.'" The Commission
requires that a charge be made by or on behalf of an aggrieved
person and that it be in writing, signed, and verified.' 3 Furthermore,
the charge must be sufficiently precise to identify the parties and
to describe generally the action or practices that are the basis of the
complaint. A charge may be amended to cure defects or omissions,
including failure to verify the charge, or to clarify and amplify alle-
gations made therein. 4 Although the Commission desires additional
specific information detailed in the charge,'" nothing additional is
required by the Commission. Additional detailed information may
be supplied by the aggrieved person during investigation of the
charge."
9. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c) (1976). The EEOC, by regulation, has designated certain Fair
Employment Practice Agencies as "Designated 706 and notice agencies" for purposes of
deferral of charges to those agencies. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.74 (1978).
10. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1976).
11. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1976).
12. Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711, 719 (7th Cir. 1969).
13. 29 C.F.R. §§ 1601.7, 1601.9 (1978).
14. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.12(b) (1978); Choate v. Caterpiller Tractor Co., 402 F.2d 357 (7th
Cir. 1968).
15. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.12(a) (1978).
16. Id. § 1601.15(b) (1978).
1978-79
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Although a literal reading of Section 706(a) of the Act would seem
to require that a charge be verified at the time of filing with the
Commission, the courts have not strictly applied this Section.
[A] reading of the entire statute makes it clear that the Con-
gressional intent in requiring an oath is to prevent the harass-
ment of respondents by reckless charges. However, this purpose
can be served by requiring verification before action is taken
by the Commission, and this was done in the instant proceed-
ing. Such a construction recognizes the remedial nature of the
statute and does not prejudice an unwary victim of discrimina-
tion by insistence upon a formal requirement which can be
supplied before the respondent is brought into the picture. Ac-
cordingly, courts have consistently held that a charge filed
within ninety days of an alleged unfair practice need not be
accompanied by the oath of the complaintant. Sworn verifica-
tion may occur later. 7
TIMELINESS OF FILING CHARGES
The EEOC has provided, by regulation, that the period of deferral
to a state or local Fair Employment Practices agency (hereinafter
FEP Agency) shall not affect the time limit for filing with the EEOC
in that timeliness of a charge is to be measured by date of the
Commission's receipt of the charge." However, interpretation of
Section 706 of the Act concerning the time limitation for filing a
charge has yet to be clearly resolved. The 180/300 day time limita-
tion referred to therein has been construed in various ways. Most
state FEP Agencies, including the Pennsylvania Human Relations
Commission, have imposed time limits of 90 days for filing a charge.
One view would thereby impose a time limit of 90 days on all
charges filed with the EEOC, since the EEOC must defer to the
FEP Agency pursuant to Section 706 of the Act. 9 However, the
17. Blue Bell Boots, Inc. v. EEOC, 418 F.2d 355, 357 (6th Cir. 1969). Accord, EEOC v.
United States Fidelity and Guarantee Co., 15 Fair Empl. Prac. Cases 555 (D.C. Md. 1976).
See also EEOC Procedural Regulations, 29 C.F.R. § 1601.12(b) (1978).
18. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.13(a) (1978).
19. Dubois v. Packard Bell Corp., 470 F.2d 973 (10th Cir. 1972). By coincidence the time
limits for filing with the EEOC and the New Mexico FEP agency, prior to the 1972 amend-
ments, were the same, 90 days; therefore, the holding in this opinion can be otherwise inter-
preted.
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majority view is that in no case will the time period for filing with
the EEOC be less than 180 days. 0
Most courts have held that if the time limit for filing with the
state agency is 180 days or less, filing with the state agency within
its time limit is necessary in order to obtain the benefit of the 300
day limit for filing with the EEOC. 2' A more interesting issue arises
if the state or local FEP Agency has a time limitation for filing of
more than 180 days. The Pittsburgh Commission on Human Rela-
tions, an EEOC designated FEP Agency, follows a time limitation
of one year. If a charging party were to file with that agency against
a respondent within the city limits more than 180, but less than 300,
days after the discriminatory act, would he be permitted the 300 day
period within which to file with the EEOC? In a similar situation,
the Fourth Circuit has held that he would.2 2 EEOC Regulations
concur with this viewpoint.?
The United States Supreme Court has ruled that the filing of a
union grievance pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement does
not toll the running of the time to file a Title VII charge. 24 Similarly,
that Court has ruled that the filing of a charge with the EEOC does
not toll the statute of limitations with respect to actions under the
Civil Rights Act of 1866.5 However, there are other situations in
which the courts have recognized an extension of the time period for
filing a charge. The Fifth Circuit has held that the time period for
filing a charge runs from the date that the charging party knew or
reasonably should have known of the discriminatory act.2
20. Davis v. Valley Distrib. Co., 522 F.2d 827 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1090
(1977); Stringer v. Pennsylvania Dep. of Community Affairs, 446 F. Supp. 704 (M.D. Pa.
1978); De Gideo v. Sperry-Univac Co., 415 F. Supp. 227 (E.D. Pa. 1976); Bradford v. Peoples
Natural Gas Co., 60 F.R.D. 432 (W.D. Pa. 1973).
21. Olson v. Rembrandt Printing Co., 511 F.2d 1228, 1231 (8th Cir. 1975) (en banc).
22. Doski v. Goldseker Co., 539 F.2d 1326 (4th Cir. 1976). See also Williamson v. Chevron
Research Co., 12 Fair Empl. Prac. Cases 95 (N.D. Cal. 1976). Contra, Robert v. Lockheed
Aircraft Corp., II Fair Empl. Prac. Cases 1440 (C.D. Cal. 1975) (subsequently decided on
other grounds), 12 Fair Empl. Prac. Cases 526 (1976).
23. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.13(d)(2)(iii) (1978).
24. International Union of Electrical Workers, Local 790 v. Robbins and Meyers, Inc., 429
U.S. 229 (1976).
25. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1976). See Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454
(1975).
26. East v. Romine, Inc., 518 F.2d 322 (5th Cir. 1975); Reeb v. Economic Opportunity
Atlanta, 516 F.2d 924 (5th Cir. 1975). These decisions were followed in an order by the United
States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania in Cropp v. Allegheny Ludlum
Industries, No. 77-529 (W.D. Pa., order of April 17, 1978) (accepting recommendation of U.S.
1978-79
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Of primary importance is the date accepted by the court as the
date of "occurrence" of the discriminatory act. The Second Circuit
held that the time limit for filing a charge was not triggered when
an assistant professor was notified that her contract would not be
renewed but, rather, when, she left the university or when a replace-
ment was hired.27 Gates v. Georgia Pacific Co.2" involved a hiring
situation in which the applicant could not tell whether she had been
rejected until she was notified. The court held that the date of notice
to her, and not the date of decision, was the date of "occurrence".
Another important point dealing with timeliness of a charge is in
the area of "continuing violations." The United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia recently held that charging
party may prove timeliness of her 1973 charge alleging that her
former employer continued to discriminate against her by adverse
references to her prospective employers, even though the example
cited by her charge occurred in 1971, since she was attacking Re-
spondent's persistent referencing policy, rather than its particular
manifestations.
As a general rule, a Title VII claim may be premised only
upon specific instances of misconduct of which the Commission
is apprised within the statutorily-prescribed time. When, how-
ever, a continuing discriminatory employment practice is al-
leged, the administrative complaint may be timely filed not-
vithstanding that the conduct impugned is comprised in part
of acts lying outside the charge-filing period. As Congress itself
has said, for those "violations [that] are continuing in nature"
it is appropriate to "measure the running of the required time
Magistrate which cited and followed Reeb). Additionally, it has been held that insanity tolls
the time period for filing a charge. Crouch v. United Press International, 10 EMPL. PRAc. DEc.
10,393 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). The Seventh Circuit recently followed the reasoning of the court
in Reeb in a case under the Age Discrimination Employment Act in Kephart v. Institute of
Gas Technology, 17 Fair Empl. Prac. Cases 1461 (7th Cir. 1978). The United States Supreme
Court split evenly on this issue under the Age Discrimination Employment Act in Dartt v.
Shell Oil Co., 539 F.2d 1256 (10th Cir. 1976), aff'd, 434 U.S. 99 (1977) (4-4).
27. Egelston v. State University College at Genesco, 535 F.2d 752 (2d Cir. 1976); accord,
Moses v. Falstaff Brewing Co., 525 F.2d 92 (8th Cir. 1975); contra Kryzyzewski v. Metropoli-
tan Govenment of Nashville, 584 F.2d 802 (6th Cir. 1978) (date of "occurrence" held to be
date charging party notified of discharge, not effective date of discharge according to payroll
records, which was 10 days later); Doski v. M. Goldseker, 539 F.2d 1326 (4th Cir. 1976). See
also Bonham v. Dresser Industries, 569 F.2d 187 (3d Cir. 1977) (decision under Age Discrimi-
nation Employment Act of 1967).
28. 492 F.2d 292 (9th Cir. 1974).
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period from the last occurrence of the discrimination and not
from the first occurrence." Challenges to assertedly unlawful
hiring and promotion policies are typical of those falling within
the ambit of the continuing-violation principle. In these related
contexts, it is the ongoing program of discrimination, rather
than any of its particular manifestations, that is the subject of
attack.2 9
Similarly, a repeated failure to promote has been held to be a
continuing violation, and therefore, timely, even though the EEOC
charge was not filed within the proscribed time limit after the dis-
criminatory act. 0 A course of conduct of denial of promotion can
constitute a continuing violation and charging party is not pre-
cluded from seeking relief for denial of promotions more than 180
days prior to filing her charge.3' On the other hand, lay-offs are not
generally considered to be continuing acts of discrimination.12
An important decision regarding timeliness in a case involving
present effects of past discrimination is the 1977 Supreme Court
Case, United Airlines v. Evans.3 Ms. Evans worked as a stewardess
for United from 1966 to February 1968, when she was forced to resign
because she married. Nine months later, the company eliminated
the no-marriage policy for stewardesses. Evans was rehired in
February 1972 as a new employee with no carry-over seniority. In
February 1973, she filed a charge with the EEOC seeking credit for
pre-1972 seniority. The Supreme Court found that charging party
did not file a timely charge based on her termination and she did
29. Shehadeh v. C & P Telephone Co., 18 Fair Empl. Prac. Cases 614, 622 (D.C. Cir.
1978); see also Wetzel Ross v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 508 F.2d 239, 246 (3d Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1011 (1975). A failure to hire may constitute a continuing violation, at
least in a situation in which the charging party seeks to represent a class and charging party
alleges a continuing violation. Kohn v. Royall, Koegel & Wells, 59 F.R.D. 515, 518 (S.D.N.Y.
1973), appeal dismissed, 496 F.2d 1094 (2d Cir. 1974); see also Miller v. Miami Prefabricating,
15 Fair Empl. Prac. Cases 1190 (S.D. Fla. 1977); Stastny v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co.,
458 F. Supp. 314 (W.D.N.C. 1978); Grobul v. Stauffer Chemical Co., 385 F.Supp. 1267, 1269
(N.D. Cal. 1974).
30. Noble v. University of Rochester, 535 F.2d 756 (2d Cir. 1976); Rich v. Martin Mar-
retta, 522 F.2d 333, 348 (10th Cir. 1975); Corbin v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 432
F. Supp. 939 (N.D. Cal. 1977); Caldwell v. Seaboard Coastline R.R., 15 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cases 428 (W.D.N.C. 1977).
31. Anderson v. United States Steel Corp., 18 Fair Empl. Prac. Cases 652 (N.D. Cal.
1978).
32. Cates v. TWA, Inc., 561 F.2d 1064 (2d Cir. 1977).
33. 431 U.S. 555 (1977).
1978-79
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not attack the bona fide nature of the seniority system. Where a
discriminatee does not make a timely charge complaining of the
discriminatory act, a seniority system that merely perpetuates the
effects of past discrimination is not unlawful.
The EEOC has interpreted Evans narrowly:
The Commission interprets United Airlines v. Evans to hold
only that discharges are not continuing violations. If a claim for
unlawful discharge is not filed within 180 days of termination,
the charge is not timely.
The Commission does not consider that the case affects the
continuing violation principle with respect to other employ-
ment practices. In particular, any allegation of discriminatory
denial of transfer or promotion will be deemed continuing if the
practice or policy accounting for the denial remains in effect
within 180 days of the charge.34
Since Evans was decided, several courts have continued to adopt
a liberal view regarding "continuing" or "policy" charges.3" In White
v. City of Suffolk, 38 plaintiff police officers filed an EEOC charge on
July 29, 1974, claiming that defendant "continually" discriminated
against them because of their race. Defendant argued that the 180
day time period for filing charges prevented plaintiffs from recover-
ing for claims grounded in events prior to January 29, 1974 (180 days
prior to filing of the charge). The court held that Evans did not
apply because in this case, since plaintiffs alleged a "pattern" of
discrimination, prolonged and continuing in many aspects of em-
ployment. Plaintiffs were not barred by the ruling in Evans from
recovery for injuries suffered prior to January 29, 1974. According
to this view, therefore, so long as any part of a discriminatory con-
duct is within the 180/300 days preceding filing of the charge, the
entire course of conduct is properly before the court and plaintiffs
may obtain relief for injuries that resulted therefrom, regardless of
whether they occurred within the charge filing period.
The Third Circuit has issued two post Evans opinions regarding
timeliness, without dealing with the difficult issues discussed above,
34. EEOC Interpretive Memorandum, 46 U.S.L.W. 2028 (July 19, 1977).
35. In re Consolidated Pretrial Proceedings in the Airline Cases, 582 F.2d 1142 (7th Cir.
1978); Farris v. Board of Educ., 576 F.2d 765 (8th Cir. 1978).
36. 460 F. Supp. 516 (E.D. Va. 1978).
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but indicating a strict adherence to the 180 day time limitation for
filing a charge, although allowing rather loose notice pleading by
plaintiff.37
The question of timeliness of amended charges has recently been
ruled upon by the Third Circuit in Hicks v. ABT Associates, Inc.3 1
The court concurred with the regulations of the EEOC which pro-
vided that amendments to charges alleging additional acts directly
related to or growing out of the original charge will relate back to
the original filing date. 9 In Hicks, plaintiff alleged that he at-
tempted to amend his charge to allege sex discrimination as well as
race discrimination, but was not permitted to amend his charge by
the EEOC Compliance Officer assigned to investigation. Neverthe-
less, the circuit court permitted plaintiff Hicks to proceed on a
claim of sex discrimination if he could prove that his allegation
regarding his attempt to amend was true, and the circuit court
remanded the case to the district court.
Promptness of service of notice of charge upon respondent by the
EEOC has been an issue of decreasing importance. Although the
statute and commission regulations provide that notice should be
served within ten days of filing of charge,40 the courts have not
penalized charging parties for failure of the Commission to strictly
comply with this provision.4 Clearly, this was also the intent of
Congress. "The Commission is to serve a notice of the charge on the
Respondent within ten days." It is not intended, however, that fail-
ure to give notice of the charge to the respondent within ten days
would prejudice the rights of the aggrieved party. 2 Indeed, the
courts have been loath to penalize the EEOC in its suits where it
has failed to serve notice of charge within ten days.4 3
37. Masco v. United Airlines, 574 F.2d 1127 (3d Cir. 1978); Bethel v. Jendoco Construction
Corp., 570 F.2d 1168 (3d Cir. 1978).
38. 572 F.2d 960 (3d Cir. 1978).
39. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.11(b) (1978). See also Morris v. City of Pittsburgh, 17 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cases 552 (W.D. Pa. 1978).
40. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e); 29 C.F.R. § 1601.14(a) (1978).
41. Russell v. American Tobacco Co., 528 F.2d 357 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 935
(1975); Watson v. Magree Womens Hospital, 438 F. Supp. 581 (W.D. Pa. 1977); McAdams
v. Thermal Industries, 428 F. Supp. 156 (W.D. Pa. 1977); Healen v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 9
EMPL. PRAc. DEC. 10,023 (N.D. Ga. 1973).
42. BNA, THE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPoRTuNrr ACT OF 1972, Section by Section Analysis,
at 129 (1973).
43. EEOC v. Airguide Corp., 539 F.2d 1038 (5th Cir. 1978); EEOC v. Kimberly Clark, 511
F.2d 1352, 1360 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 994 (1975); EEOC v. Children's Hospital,
1978-79
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EXHAUSTION OF REMEDIES AND DEFERRAL
An investigation by the EEOC and determination of reasonable
cause to believe that the employer had violated Title VII is not a
prerequisite to a Title VII suit filed by an individual.4 Neither does
an EEOC finding of "no reasonable cause" bar suit by a charging
party. 5 Likewise, the failure of the EEOC to attempt or achieve
conciliation does not bar the individual from bringing court action.16
Additionally, the charging party need not exhaust his union reme-
dies before bringing a Title VII lawsuit.47
The courts have held that the state or local Fair Employment
Practices agency must be given an opportunity to investigate the
charge, but state or local remedies need not be exhausted before
litigation ensues." The seminal case regarding deferral of EEOC
charges to FEP agencies is Love v. Pullman Co.4" In that decision,
the Supreme Court approved the procedure adopted by the EEOC
of receiving charges, forwarding them to the recognized FEP
Agency, then automatically assuming jurisdiction after the 60 day
deferral period has expired; even oral deferrals were sanctioned by
this decision. Belated deferrals by the EEOC have also received
court sanction, extending to cases in which the deferral has taken
place long after the FEP Agency's statute of limitations has
passed. 50 The courts have also allowed the EEOC to go through the
motions of making a deferral, where there has been no previous
deferral, years after the filing of a charge and after charging party
13 EMPL. PRAC. DEC. 11,359 (W.D. Pa. 1976), rev'd on other grounds, 556 F.2d 222 (3d Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1009 (1978); EEOC v. T. Marzetti, 11 EMPL. PRAc. DEC. 10,734
(S.D. Ohio 1976).
44. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 798 (1973); Danner v. Phillips
Petroleum Co., 447 F.2d 159 (5th Cir. 1971); Fekete v. United States Steel Corp, 424 F.2d
331 (3d Cir. 1970).
45. Fekete v. United States Steel Corp., 424 F.2d 331 (3d Cir. 1970); McDonald v. Ameri-
can Federation of Musicians, 308 F. Supp. 664 (N.D. I1. 1970).
46. Watson v. Limbach Co., 333 F. Supp. 754 (S.D. Ohio 1971); Westerlund v. Fireman's
Fund Insurance Co., 10 EMPL. Panc. DEC. 10,456 (D.C. Cal. 1975).
47. Smallwood v. National Can Co., 583 F.2d 419 (9th Cir. 1978); Waters v. Wisconsin
Steel Works, 502 F.2d 1309, 1316 (7th Cir. 1974).
48. Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454 (1975); Shudtz v. Dean Witter &
Co., 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cases 1297 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
49. 404 U.S. 522 (1972).
50. Crosslin v. Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Co., 400 U.S. 1004 (1971);
Ferguson v. Kroger Co., 545 F.2d 1034 (6th Cir. 1976); Watson v. Magee Womens Hospital,
438 F. Supp. 581 (W.D. Pa. 1977); McAdams v. Thermal Industries, 428 F. Supp. 156 (W.D.
Pa. 1977).
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has filed suit in federal district court." The theory behind this posi-
tion is that charging party should not be penalized for the errors of
the EEOC. The Fifth Circuit has gone so far as to hold that failure
to ever defer a charge will not bar subsequent suit under Title VII.12
If charging party's original charge has been properly deferred by
the EEOC, subsequent amendments to that charge need not be
deferred so long as the new allegations are reasonably related to, or
grow out of, the original charge. Furthermore, the majority view is
that amendments to the original charge containing additional alle-
gations need not be filed with the EEOC, so long as the additional
allegations included in the court complaint are similar or related to
the EEOC charge. 4
EEOC regulations now provide that an FEP Agency designated
as a deferral agency under Section 706 of the Act may agree to waive
its right to exclusive processing of the charge during the sixty day
period following filing of the charge. The EEOC and most desig-
nated FEP Agencies have entered into "Worksharing Agreements"
whereby the FEP Agency agrees to waive its right to initial exclusive
processing of charges (with rare exceptions) if the charges have been
initially filed with the EEOC. The EEOC, likewise, agrees to forego
processing charges initially filed with the FEP Agency prior to the
agency's having completed its investigation. Furthermore, under
the worksharing agreements, each agency designates the other as its
agent for the purpose of receiving charges. Waiver of jurisdiction by
FEP Agencies has been endorsed by the United States District
51. Gallego v. Arthur G. McKee & Co., 550 F.2d 456 (9th Cir. 1977); Waters v. Heublein,
Inc., 547 F.2d 466 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 915 (1977); Mitchell v. Mid-
Continent Spring Co., 466 F.2d 24 (6th Cir. 1974).
52. White v. Dallas Independent School District, 18 Fair Empl. Prac. Cases 204, 207 (5th
Cir. 1978) (en banc). See also EEOC v. Wah Chang Albany Corp., 499 F.2d 187, 189 n.3 (9th
Cir. 1974). But see Bell v. Wyeth Laboratories, 17 Fair Empl. Prac. Cases 306 (E.D. Pa. 1978);
Cook v. Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Co., 397 F. Supp. 1217 (D.C. Ariz. 1975).
53. Oubichon v. North American Rockwell Corp., 482 F.2d 569, 571 (9th Cir. 1973); Tipler
v. E. I. DuPont de Nemours and Co., 443 F.2d 125, 131 (6th Cir. 1971); Black Musicians v.
Local 60-471 AFL-CIO, 375 F. Supp. 902, 909 (W.D. Pa. 1974); Latino v. Rainbo Bakers, Inc.,
358 F. Supp. 870 (D.C. Colo. 1973). See also Eastwood v. Victor Temporaries, 441 F. Supp.
51 (N.D. Ga. 1977).
54. Sanchez v. Standard Brands, 431 F.2d 445 (5th Cir. 1970); Morris v. City of Pitts-
burgh, 445 F. Supp. 981 (W.D. Pa. 1978); National Org. for Women v. Sperry Rand Corp, 18
EMPL. PRAc. DEC. 8,747 (D. Conn. 1978); Ramirez v. Nat'l Distillers & Chemical Corp., 18
EMPL. PRAc. DEC. 8,818 (C.D. Cal. 1978). See also Hicks v. ABT Associates, 572 F.2d 960
(3d Cir. 1978). But see Smith v. Joseph Home Co., 438 F. Supp. 1207 (W.D. Pa. 1977).
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Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania."5 The court in
Morgan determined that the waiver of deferral by the plaintiff, in
accordance with an agreement between EEOC and The Pennsyl-
vania Human Relations Commission, constituted a valid early ter-
mination of proceedings pursuant to Section 706(c) of the Act. 51
In Taylor v. Vocational Rehabilitation Center,57 defendant moved
to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction because the EEOC,
pursuant to an agreement between it and the Pennsylvania Human
Relations Commission, had deferred the charge directly to the Pitts-
burgh Commission on Human Relations, which, at the time, was
not a designated 706 Agency. The court denied the motion to dis-
miss, thus recognizing the validity of such waivers. Similarly, defer-
ral to the Pittsburgh Commission on Human Relations,. in a case
which the respondent employer was situated outside the city limits,
was not fatal to charging party because the charge was later deferred
to the proper authority, the Pennsylvania Human Relations Com-
mission, two years after the charge was filed.5 8
SCOPE OF LAWSUIT
An important issue not yet settled is concerned with the scope of
the federal court complaint as related to the EEOC charge. The
seminal case is Sanchez v. Standard Brands.59 The court held that
the scope of the federal court complaint is defined by "the scope of
the EEOC investigation which can reasonably be expected to grow
out of the charge of discrimination.""0 The Ninth Circuit has held
55. Morgan v. Sharon, Pennsylvania Bd. of Educ., 445 F. Supp. 142, 145 (W.D. Pa. 1978).
A 706 Agency may waive its right to the period of exclusive processing of charges provided
under section 706(c) of Title VII with respect to any charge or category of charges. Where a
706 Agency has waived its right to the exclusive processing period with respect to any category
of charges, the Commission will assume jurisdiction over charges within that category upon
receipt. Copies of such charges shall be forwarded to the appropriate 706 Agency. 29 C.F.R.
§ 1601.13(c)(3) (1978)..
56. Accord, Stewart v. Charley Bros., No. 78-1182 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 19, 1978); EEOC v.
Western States Machine Co., 17 Fair Empl. Prac. Cases 1356 (S.D. Ohio 1978). See also
Barela v. United Nuclear Corp., 462 F.2d 149 (10th Cir. 1972); EEOC v. Rinella and Rinella,
401 F. Supp. 175 (N.D. Ill. 1975); Bauman v. Union Oil Co., 400 F. Supp. 1021 (N.D. Cal.
1973).
57. 10 Fair Empl. Prac. Cases 936 (W.D. Pa. 1975).
58. McAdams v. Thermal Industries, Inc., 428 F. Supp. 156 (W.D. Pa. 1977).
59. 431 F.2d 455 (5th Cir. 1970); accord, Ostapowicz v. Johnson Bronze Co., 541 F.2d 394,
398-99 (3d Cir. 1976); Jenkins v. United Gas Corp., 400 F.2d 28, 33 (5th Cir. 1968).
60. Id. at 466. The complaint is therefore not limited to what the EEOC actually investi-
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that the civil complaint may include "any discrimination like or
related to the allegations of the EEOC charge, including new acts
occurring during pendency of the charge before the EEOC."'
In Hicks v. ABTAssociates, 6 2 the Third Circuit recently delimited
the proper scope of the federal court complaint to cover all areas
which could have been investigated by the EEOC. Charging party,
a white male, had filed a charge alleging race discrimination. The
EEOC found no reasonable cause to believe that he had been dis-
criminated against and issued a notice of right to sue; plaintiff
thereafter filed suit based on sex and race discrimination. Plaintiff
claimed that he was not contacted by the Commission investigator
and did not know that the investigation was proceeding until the
determination of no reasonable cause was sent to him. Since there
was no charge of sex discrimination filed and the EEOC investiga-
tion did not include investigation of acts of sex discrimination, de-
fendant argued that the EEOC investigation set the outer limit to
the scope of the civil complaint. The circuit court disagreed, finding
that the test is whether the claims of sex discrimination would have
been investigated, given a reasonable investigation of the charge.63
Furthermore, the court stated that if the EEOC acted improperly
by failing to accept an amendment to the plaintiffs charge, which
would have included a sex discrimination claim, there is jurisdiction
over that sex discrimination claim.
The United States District Court for the Western District of
Pennsylvania has recently pointed out that "[A]ll Title VII judicial
complaints are broader than the adminisrative charge."64 The court
emphasized that this is due to the fact that the EEOC charge form
does not allow for an extensive narrative with detailed explanations;
furthermore, charges are usually written by lawmen untrained in
the law. Although courts have agreed that the scope of an EEOC
charge is to be liberally construed, they have not clarified the ques-
tion of which issues ffot raised in the EEOC charge may be included
gated, but to what it could reasonably have investigated. Accord, McBride v. Delta Airlines,
Inc., 551 F.2d 113 (6th Cir. 1977).
61. Oubichon v. North American Rockwell Corp., 482 F.2d 569, 571 (9th Cir. (1973);
accord, Chapman v. Pacific Telephone and Telegraph Co., 456 F. Supp. 65 (N.D. Cal. 1978).
But see Smith v. Joseph Home Co., 438 F. Supp. 1207 (W.D. Pa. 1977).
62. Hicks v. ABT Associates, 572 F.2d 960 (3d Cir. 1978).
63. Id. at 966. Contra, Saad v. Burns Int'l Security Services, Inc., 456 F. Supp. 33 (D.D.C.
1978).
64. Morris v. City of Pittsburgh, 445 F. Supp. at 982.
1978-79
Duquesne Law Review
in the civil action.6 5
The EEOC has recently taken steps to reduce its much publicized
backlog of charges by making extensive inquiries regarding alleged
discriminatory acts during the taking of the charge by EEOC intake
officers."6 The objective of this extensive probe is to eliminate
charges obviously without merit or non-jurisdictional and also to pin
down the charging party to specific allegations and detailed facts in
order to assist compliance officers in investigation and attempted
settlement. It has also been reported that EEOC intake officers
nationwide are discouraging charging parties from filing class action
charges and this has aroused the ire of civil rights groups who desire
class-wide investigations. 7 Another possible effect of the Commis-
sion's discouraging charging parties from filing class charges and
requiring specific statements of acts of discrimination from charging
parties is that in subsequent civil actions charging parties may be
precluded from exceeding the scope of their tightly written
charges.6 8
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO SUE
A great number of problems have arisen in connection with issu-
ance or nonissuance of Notice of Right to Sue by the EEOC. The
Notice of Right to Sue, along with a timely filed charge, have been
characterized as jurisdictional prerequisites to filing civil action
under Title VI 6I5
Issuance of the Notice has been described as: "a ministerial act
required both by the statute and applicable regulations and not one
involving the exercise of discretion by the Commission."7 0
Section 706(f)(1) of the Act provides that if the Commission "has
not entered into a conciliation agreement to which the person ag-
grieved is a party, the Commission, . . . shall so notify the person
65. Compare the strict view of Wilson v. Allied Chemical Corp., 456 F. Supp. 249 (E.D.
Va. 1978) and Eastwood v. Victor Temporaries, 441 F. Supp. 51, 53 (N.D. Ga. 1977), with
the liberal view of White v. City of Suffolk, 18 Fair Empl. Prac. Cases 605 (E.D. Va. 1978),
and National Org. for Women v. Sperry-Rand Corp., 457 F. Supp. 1338 (D.C. Conn. 1978).
See also Curran v. Portland Super. Sch. Comm., 435 F. Supp. 1063 (S.D. Me. 1977).
66. EEOC, RAPID CHARGE PROCESSING MANuAL 302 (ist ed. October 12, 1977).
67. BNA Daily Report, No. 230, November 29, 1978.
68. See Aungst v. J.C. Penney Co., Inc., 456 F. Supp. 370, 375 (W.D. Pa. 1978). See also
29 C.F.R. § 1601.12(a) (1978); Id. § 1601.15(b).
69. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
70. Jones v. United Gas Improvement Corp., 383 F. Supp. 420, 424 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
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aggrieved and within 90 days of giving of such notice, a civil action
may be brought against the Respondent named in the charge
. . . ." Prior to April 4, 1975, it had been the practice of the EEOC
to issue a "Failure of Concilation" letter to charging party and
thereafter to issue "Notice of Right to Sue" only at charging party's
request. The United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Missouri, in a strict reading of the statute, held that the "Failure
of Conciliation" letter constituted Notice of Right to Sue and trig-
gered the 90 day filing period. The Eighth Circuit reversed the Mis-
souri district court.7' Most other federal courts have found that only
formal Notice of Right to Sue triggers the ninety day period for filing
civil action. 72 Since April 4, 1975, the EEOC has issued a combined
"Notice of Right to Sue (Conciliation Failure)" and, therefore, this
issue should not continue to trouble the courts unless an EEOC
District office were to send a Failure of Conciliation letter to charg-
ing party by mistake.
It would appear clear that in order to proceed in federal district
court under Title VII, plaintiff must first have filed a charge and
obtained Notice of Right to Sue from the EEOC.73 However, this is
not always necessary. It has long been settled that relief can be
granted to non-charging parties in a class action .7 However, the
Eighth and Fifth Circuits have held that non-charging parties may
intervene in a non-class action and obtain relief.75 On the other
hand, the Ninth Circuit has held that non-charging parties cannot
rely upon a charge filed by another and simply file suit without first
following the requisite administrative procedures. 6
The United States District Court for the Western District of
Pennsylvania has allowed a named plaintiff to proceed in a Title VII
class action, even though she had not filed a charge with the EEOC,
where the union to which she belonged filed the EEOC charge.77 The
71. Harris v. Sherwood Medical Industries, 386 F. Supp. 1149 (E.D. Mo. 1974), rev'd, 533
F.2d 353 (8th Cir. 1976).
72. Lynn v. Western Gilette, Inc., 564 F.2d 1282 (9th Cir. 1977); Wilson v. Sharon Steel
Corp., 549 F.2d 276 (3d Cir. 1977).
73. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974), discussed in text accompanying
note 69 supra.
74. Albermarble Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 414 n.8 (1975).
75. Allen v. Amalgamated Transit Union, 14 Fair Empl. Prac. Cases 1494 (8th Cir. 1977);
Wheeler v. American Home Products, 16 Fair Empl. Prac. Cases 157 (5th Cir. 1977).
76. Inda v. United Airlines, Inc., 16 1 ir Empl. Prac. Cases 251 (9th Cir. 1977).
77. Schoeppner v. General Telephone Co., 12 EMPL. PRAc. DEC. 11,271 (W.D. Pa. 1976).
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United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin
has permitted persons who have not filed EEOC charges to join as
co-plaintiffs in a class action, but the court would only consider
issues which charging parties before the EEOC had standing to
raise."
The naming of the proper respondent with the EEOC would seem
to be a prerequisite to proceeding against that entity in federal
district court under Title VII. The Third Circuit has reviewed the
theories for allowing suit against unnamed respondents in Cqnavan
v. Beneficial Finance Corp."5 The court pointed out that EEOC
charges should be liberally construed because they are filed by lay-
men and generally without legal assistance. After citing various
authorities allowing joinder of unnamed parties, some under Rule
19 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and others under Rule 21,
and also citing authorities to contrary, the court remanded the case
to the district court for further discovery on the question of whether
the party named in the EEOC charge adequately represented the
interests of those defendants not named in the EEOC charge, in
order for the plaintiff to have an opportunity to discover the exist-
ence of an agency relationship. Other decisions from federal district
courts in Pennsylvania have dismissed Title VII actions as to defen-
dant individuals employed by properly named respondent-
defendants, but not named themselves in the EEOC charge and not
having received notice of charge or engaged in conciliation discus-
sions. 0 It has been held that a civil-action may be filed and recovery
may be obtained against a successor corporation not named in a
charge if a charge has been filed against the predecessor and the
successor corporation had notice of the charge.8 '
The courts have been fairly liberal with respect to joinder of a
78. Muka v. Nicolet Paper Co., 452.F. Supp. 491 (E.D. Wisc. 1978). See also Oatis v.
Crown Zellerbach Corp., 398 F.2d 496, 499 (5th Cir. 1968); Jones v. United Gas Improvement
Corp., 383 F. Supp. 420 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
79. 533 F.2d 860 (3d Cir. 1977).
80. Peterson v. Lehigh Valley District Council, 453 F. Supp. 735 (E.D. Pa. 1978); Batis
v. Great American Savings and Loan Association, 452 F. Supp. 588 (W.D. Pa. 1978); Kutska
v. California State College, 410 F. Supp. 48 (W.D. Pa. 1976); Harris v. Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania, 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cases 488 (N.D. Pa. 1976). But see Holiday v. Bell's
Restaurant, BAB, Inc. and Isabelle Laux, No. 75-124 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 30, 1976).
81. EEOC v. MacMillan Bloedel Containers, Inc., 503 F.2d 1086 (6th Cir. 1974); Escam-
illa v. Mosher Steel Co., 386 F. Supp. 101 (D.C. Tex. 1975). But see Wiggins v. Spector
Freight System, Inc., 583 F.2d 882, 886 (6th Cir. 1978).
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union not charged before the EEOC. In a case in which the local was
charged but the international was not charged, the Third Circuit set
forth the following factors to be examined by a court in determining
wehther an EEOC charge against the international was necessary:
(1) Whether its role ". . could through reasonable effort by
the complaint be ascertained at the time of the filing of the
EEOC complaint; (2) whether, under the circumstances, the
interests of a named are so similar as the unnamed party's that
for the purpose of obtaining voluntary conciliation and compli-
ance it would be unnecessary to include the unnamed party in
the EEOC proceedings; (3) whether its absence from the EEOC
proceedings resulted in actual prejudice to the interests of the
unnamed party; (4) whether the unnamed party has in some
way represented to the complainant that its relationship with
the complainant is to be through the named party. Considera-
tion of these factors should be initially in the hands of the
district court."'
Most courts have allowed an uncharged union to be joined under
Fed. R. Civ. P.19, where the union is needed to participate in relief
afforded plaintiffs, such as restructuring of the Collective Bargain-
ing Agreement.8 This liberal allowance of joinder may be due to the
fact that dismissal of the entire action for lack of indispensable
party may be the only alternative.
Occasionally, charging parties have proceeded to federal district
court without first obtaining notice of right to sue from the EEOC.
The courts have held that issuance of the notice during pending
litigation cures the jurisdictional defect."' Similarly, where the
EEOC has issued right to sue notice prematurely, before the run-
ning of the 180 day period for investigation, most courts have not
82. Glus v. G.C. Murphy Co., 15 Fair Empl. Prac. Cases 998, 1004 (3d Cir. 1978). See
Evans v. Sheraton Park Hotel, 503 F.2d 177 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Braxton v. Virginia Folding
Box Co., 72 F.R.D. 124, 128 (E.D. Va. 1976). But see EEOC v. Wilson & Co., 18 Fair Emp.
Prac. Cases 57 (W.D. Okla. 1978).
83. Coker v. Marmon Group Inc., 455 F. Supp. 398 (D.S.C. 1978); Holden v. H.J. Heinz
Co., No. 76-20 (W.D. Pa. July 25, 1978) (unreported opinion in which neither the local nor
the international union was charged, but the court allowed both to be named defendants and
potentially liable for monetary damages as well); Plummer v. Chicago Journeyman Plumbers,
452 F. Supp. 1127, 1135 (N.D. Il1. 1978).
84. Webb v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 455 F. Supp. 821 (E.D. Pa. 1978); Jones v.
United Gas Improvement Corp., 383 F. Supp. at 424.
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dismissed such actions where the EEOC case backlog precluded
action on the charge within the 180 day period. 5
The EEOC Procedural Regulations now provide that if charging
party requests a notice of right to sue prior to the expiration of 180
days, the EEOC may issue such notice if the District Director has
determined that it is probable that the Commission will be unable
to complete its processing within 180 days and has so certified."
A not uncommon occurrence is that charging parties will obtain
notice of right to sue, but not file in the proper forum or within the
90 day period. 7 The 90 day period for filing runs from receipt of
notice, not sending of notice. Although the courts have adhered
strictly to the time limitation in which to file suit after issuance of
notice of right to sue," a recent decision allows charging party an
extra three days to file suit in light of Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(e), since the
notice of right to sue is customarily served by mail. 0
Plaintiff's Title VII complaint must clearly allege compliance
with all jurisditional prerequisites to suit, or it is subject to dis-
missal." Furthermore, plaintiff cannot delay unduly before bringing
suit because of laches. Although most courts hold that Title VII
actions are not barred by applicable state statutes of limitations, 2
85. Howard v. Mercantile Commerce Trust Co., 8 EMPL. PRAc. DEC. 9,842 (D. Mo. 1974);
Bryant v. California Brewers Ass'n, 18 Fair Empl. Prac. Cases 626 (9th Cir. 1978); Milner v.
National School of Health Technology, 409 F. Supp. 1389 (E.D. Pa. 1976); Weise v. Syracuse
University, 10 EMPL. PRAC. DEC. 10,294 (N.D.N.Y. 1975). But see Loney v. Carr-Lowrey
Glass Co., 18 Fair Empl. Prac. Cases 1243 (D. Md. 1978).
86. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.28 (a)(2) (1978).
87. Dickinson v. Chrysler Corp., 456 F. Supp. 43 (E.D. Mich. 1978) (filing in state court
did not toll running of 90 days). But see Burnett v. N.Y. Central R.R., 380 U.S. 424 (1965);
Smith v. Joseph Home Co., No. 75-964 (W.D. Pa.) (order of October 17, 1978 recognized
tolling of period during which court considered plaintiff's motion to amend complaint; court
therefore allowed plaintiff to file new action based on that Notice of Right to Sue). See also
Huston v. General Motors Corp., 477 F.2d 1003 (8th Cir. 1973) (petition for appointment of
counsel tolled the 90 day time limit).
88. Archie v. Chicago Truck Drivers, Helpers and Warehouse Workers Union, 585 F.2d
210 (7th Cir. 1978).
89. Hofer v. Campbell, 581 F.2d 975 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
90. Tavernaris v. Beaver School District, 17 Fair Empl. Prac. Cases 1435 (W.D. Pa. 1978).
See also Russell v. American Tobacco Co., 528 F.2d at 359.
91. Trent v. Allegheny Airlines, 17 Fair Empl. Prac. Cases 503 (W.D. Pa. 1977); Gibson
v. Kroger Co., 506 F.2d 647 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 914 (1975); Nishiyama v.
North American Rockwell Corp., 49 F.R.D. 288, 293 (C.D. Cal. 1970).
92. Kirk v. Rockwell International Corp., 578 F.2d 814 (9th Cir. 1978); Draper v. United
States Pipe and Foundry, 527 F.2d 515 (6th Cir. 1975); Shelton v. Beneficial Finance Corp.,
434 F. Supp. 1159 (W.D. Pa. 1977); contra, Vogel v. Torrance Bd. of Educ., 447 F. Supp. 258
(C.D. Cal. 1978).
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plaintiff may be barred from back pay relief if defendant has suf-
fered prejudice by the delay. 3
The Supreme Court has held that state statutes of limitation do
not apply to suits by the EEOC. In Occidental Life Insurance Co.
v. EEOC,1 the Court permitted the EEOC to bring an action more
than three years after receipt of the charge. The only time limitation
on the Commission is that it may not file suit during the initial 30
days from filing of the charge, unless it is seeking preliminary or
temporary relief pursuant to Section 706(f)(2) of the Act. 5
An individual cannot bring a separate suit involving the same
facts after one is brought by the EEOC; rather, the individual must
seek to become a party to the EEOC suit" and he may intervene as
of right.97 Furthermore, an individual class member is precluded
from later litigating issues dismissed at a class action.
DEFERRAL AS JURISDICTIONAL PREREQUISITE TO LITIGATION
The preceding analysis has served to outline the present state of
the law with respect to prerequisites to litigation. In general, the
courts which have allowed charging parties to proceed to civil litiga-
tion despite irregularities in pre-litigation procedures have done so
because of a recognition of the remedial nature of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 (therefore jurisdictional requirements
should be liberally construed) 9 and because of the feeling that
charging parties should not be penalized for being misled by govern-
ment agencies'0 or for errors of government agencies. 0' Despite this
concern for the rights of charging parties, the courts have long
93. Richardson v. Delta Drayage Co., 433 F. Supp. 50 (E.D. La. 1977).
94. 432 U.S. 355 (1977).
95. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(2) and 29 C.F.R. § 1601.27 (1978). Several courts have held that
charging parties may proceed immediately to court under section 706 (f)(2) without receipt
of Notice of Right to Sue. See Berg v. Richmond Unified School District, 528 F.2d 1208 (9th
Cir. 1975), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 98 S. Ct. 623 (1977).
96. McClain v. Wagner Electric Corp., 550 F.2d 1115, 1119 (8th Cir. 1977).
97. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1).
98. Dickerson v. United States Steel Corp., 17 Fair Empl. Prac. Cases 1589 (3d Cir. 1978).
99. Glus v. G.C. Murphy Co., 15 Fair Empl. Prac. Cases at 1003-04.
100. Richerson v. Jones, 572 F.2d 89 (3d Cir. 1978); Zambuto v. A.T.&T., 544 F.2d 1333
(5th Cir. 1977); De Matteis v. Eastman Kodak Co., 520 F.2d 409 (2d Cir. 1975).
101. Mitchell v. Mid-Continent Spring Co. of Kentucky, 466 F.2d 24 (6th Cir. 1974); Jones
v. United Gas Improvement Corp., 383 F. Supp. 420, 424 (E.D. Pa. 1974); McAdams v.
Thermal Industries, 428 F. Supp. 156 (W.D. Pa. 1977).
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pointed to the United States Supreme Court opinion of Love v.
Pullman0 2 as evidence that deferral of charges by the EEOC to Fair
Employment Practices Agencies is required. Although Love v.
Pullman did not hold that deferral is required, the Supreme Court
decision in that case certainly suggests such a conclusion. "A person
claiming to be aggrieved by a violation of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 1978 Stat. 253, may not maintain a suit for
redress in Federal District Court unitl he has first unsuccessfully
pursued certain avenues of potential relief."' 3 The Third Circuit, in
dicta, has interpreted Love to require resort to a state or local FEP
agency. In Holiday v. Ketchum, MacCleod and Grove, Inc.,'04 an
action under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, '5
the circuit court stated as follows: "The Supreme Court has con-
strued this provision in Title VII [section 706(c)] to require a prior
resort to state remedies."'06 In Holliday, the Third Circuit empha-
sized the differences, with respect to resorting to state remedies,
between actions under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
and Title VII. The court pointed out that Section 706(c) of Title VII
has often been interpreted as requiring prior resort to state FEP
Agencies, stating that legislative history is very clear on that point
and most courts have followed this reasoning. In like manner, the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsyl-
vania has interpreted Section 706(c) as creating a jurisdictional bar
to Title VII plaintiffs who have failed to resort to state agencies.'07
Of more recent vintage than the Supreme Court's 1972 opinion in
Love v. Pullman, the Supreme Court held in 1973,108 and 1974'" that
there were only two "jurisdictional prerequisites" to a Title VII
action: (1) A charge filed timely with the EEOC, and (2) Receipt
and action upon the EEOC's statutory Notice of Right to Sue. These
two decisions, McDonnell Douglas v. Green and Alexander v.
102. 404 U.S. 522 (1972).
103. 404 U.S. 522, 523 (1972).
104. Holliday v. Ketchum, MacCleod and Grove, Inc., 17 Fair Empl. Prac. Cases 1175,
1179 n.29 (3d Cir. 1978).
105. 29 U.S.C. § 621.
106. 17 Fair Empl. Prac. Cases at 1175.
107. Bell v. Wyeth Laboratories Inc., 17 Fair Empl. Prac. Cases 306 (E.D. Pa. 1978);
Rouse v. Gulf Oil Corp., 350 F. Supp. 178 (E.D. Pa. 1972). See also King v. New Hampshire
Dept. of Resources, 420 F. Supp. 1317 (D.C. N.H. 1976).
108. McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 798 (1973).
109. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 47 (1974).
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Gardner-Denver, may indicate that the Supreme Court is moving
toward a more liberal attitude concerning prerequisites to litigation
than those implied in Love v. Pullman.
Although the Third Circuit is not about to give up its position
stated in Holliday, it has shown some inclination toward liberaliza-
tion as evidenced in its decision in Richerson v. Jones. 0 That deci-
sion involved an employee of the United States Navy whose only
recourse to complain regarding discriminatory practices is under the
provisions of Section 717 of Title VII. Plaintiff had filed an adminis-
trative complaint with the United States Naval Department's EEO
Official, but withdrew his formal discrimination complaint after
being assured by the EEO Officials that steps would be taken to end
the racial discrimination alleged in the complaint. Although the
procedures invoked by a Federal employee are quite different from
those invoked by employees of private industry under Title VII, the
Third Circuit indicated that there are exceptions to the exhaustion
requirement of Title VII and allowed the plaintiff to proceed, even
though he had not exhausted his administrative remedies. The
court emphasized that the government, in effect, misled the plain-
tiff and that plaintiff should not be penalized for the fact that he
had followed the procedures suggested by the EEO Officials. The
reasoning in the Richerson case was followed by the Ufiited States
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in a case
involving tolling, Webb v. Westinghouse Electric Corp. " The Third
Circuit has also shown its trend toward a more liberal attitude. in
Glus v. G. C. Murphy Co. " and Hicks v. ABT Associates. "13 "This
right, to bring a civil action, should not be defeated by the EEOC's
failure to comply with its statutory obligations.""'
A number of circuit court decisions have not analyzed Love v.
Pullman in the same manner as the Third Circuit. In an action
predating Love v. Pullman, the Supreme Court vacated the Ninth
Circuit's decision in Crosslin v. Mountain States Telephone and
Telegraph Co. " In Crosslin, the Ninth Circuit held that the plain-
tiffs action had to be dismissed because it had not properly been
110. 572 F.2d 89 (3d Cir. 1978).
111. 18 Fair Empl. Prac. Cases 315 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
112. 562 F.2d 880 (3d Cir. 1978).
113. 572 F.2d 960 (3d Cir. 1978).
114. Id. at 964.
115. 422 F.2d 1028 (9th Cir. 1970), vacated, 400 U.S. 1004 (1971).
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referred to the appropriate state agency, even though her charge had
not been so referred because of the EEOC's position that referral
was not required to that agency. In the Supreme Court, the Solicitor
General suggested the Ninth Circuit's decision should be reversed
in so far as it required the dismissal of the plaintiff's action, and
that it would be appropriate instead to require a remand to the
district court, which could stay proceedings to allow an appropriate
referral to the state agency. The Supreme Court vacated the Ninth
Circuit's decision in light of this suggestion. Similarly, in Mitchell
v. Mid-Continent Spring Co. of Kentucky"' the Sixth Circuit acted
on a case in which plaintiff's charge had not been deferred by the
EEOC to the Kentucky Human Rights Commission, and the court
ordered that the charge be deferred, albeit belatedly, by the EEOC
to the state agency in order for charging party to proceed in federal
district court. In that case, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals sim-
ply followed the procedure adopted by the Supreme Court in
Crosslin.
The Fifth Circuit has recently taken a step beyond Crosslin in
White v. Dallas Independent School District."7 In that case the
EEOC did not defer to the Dallas District or County Attorney,
claiming that the District and County Attorneys' Offices were not
designated as appropriate FEP deferral agencies under Section
706(c) of Title VII. The Fifth Circuit found that the EEOC should
have, in fact, deferred the charge to the District or County Attorney,
but that the mistake of the EEOC should not operate to penalize
the charging party. Rather than having the EEOC go through the
procedure of a sham deferral as was done in Crosslin and Mitchell,
the court recognized that the time limitation for filing with the state
had long since passed and remanded the case to the federal district
court with instructions to proceed to the rights of the parties under
Title VII. Although the court did not expressly decide that deferral
is not jurisdictional, it nevertheless implicitly recognized that the
only two jurisdictional prerequisites to suit are the timely filing of
a charge with the EEOC and receipt and action upon notice of right
to sue. Thus, we have seen the circuits take three different positions
regarding the necessity of resort to FEP Agencies as evidenced by
the Third Circuit in Holliday,"' the Ninth and Sixth Circuits in
116. 466 F.2d 24, 26 (6th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 928 (1973).
117. 581 F.2d 556 (5th Cir. 1978).
118. See text accompanying notes 104-107 supra.
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Crosslin"I and Mitchell2 0 respectively, and the Fifth Circuit in
White. '12 It is anticipated that this conflict will be resolved by the
Supreme Court in the not-too-distant future.
The Fifth Circuit analysis appears to be more in accordance with
the intent and history of Title VII than the analysis of the other
circuits regarding deferral as a jurisdictional prerequisite to litiga-
tion. As pointed out in White, the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission's own regulations require that the Commission defer all
charges by transmitting copies thereof to the appropriate FEP agen-
cies. "Title VII created federal rights in a plaintiff which are not
necessarily barred by the running of a state statute of limita-
tions.' 12 2 A charging party who has reasonably relied upon the
EEOC to defer a charge should not lose all rights under Title VII
simply because of a procedural mistake by the Commission. The
provision of Title VII requiring initial recourse to state or local FEP
agencies 23 was enacted with the intent of avoiding duplication of
efforts by the EEOC and the FEP agency, thereby preserving the
effectiveness of FEP agencies,2 4 and not with the intent of enacting
a barrier to access to federal courts for violation of a charging party's
rights under Title VII. The Supreme Court has emphasized the
broad remedial purposes of Title VII in the 1975 decision of
Albermarble Paper Co. v. Moody,2 5 and it would be suprising, as
well as taking a backward step in light of Albermarble Paper Co.,
'McDonnell Douglas, and Gardner-Denver, were the Court to adopt
the Third Circuit view regarding this issue. To accept the views of
the Ninth and Sixth Circuits would be to require needless delay in
action by federal district courts while charges are being deferred to
FEP agencies long after state statutes of limitations have passed,
and therefore, such deferrals would have absolutely no utilitarian
value.
119. See text accompanying note 115 supra.
120. See text accompanying note 116 supra.
121. See text accompanying note 117 supra.
122. White v. Dallas Independent School District, 581 F.2d 556, 562 (5th Cir. 1978).
123. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c).
124. 110 CONG. Rxc. 12,721-25 (1964), reprinted in EEOC, IxsSLATrvE HISTORY OF TrLES
VII AND XI OF CIVIL RIGHTS AcT OF 1964, at 3003 (1970).
125. 422 U.S. 407 (1975).
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CONCLUSION
The federal district courts have indicated a strong pre-disposition
toward a liberal interpretation of Title VII since its enactment in
1964, and this position has been evidenced in the interpretation of
several different sections of the Act. Although Section 706(b) of the
Act would seem to require that a charge be filed under oath or
affirmation at the time of filing with the Commission, the courts
have permitted verification to take place at any time prior to inves-
tigation of the charge. 2 Secondly, the courts have also ignored the
apparent requirement of Section 706(f)(1) that the Commission
issue Notice of Right to Sue 180 days after filing of the charge, if
the Commission has not entered into a conciliation agreement or
filed a civil action.' 7 Thirdly, the courts have accorded an extremely
liberal interpretation to the language of Section 706(f)(1) relating to
failure of conciliation as constituting notice of right to sue, finding
that only the formal Right to Sue letter starts the 90 day period for
filing suit. 28
The aforementioned examples are indications that the courts
have found that Congress could not have intended procedural tech-
nicalities, due to no fault of the charging party, to bar access to
federal court. The intent of Congress requiring that an opportunity
be given FEP Agencies to process Title VII charges was three-fold:
(1) to encourage more states to adopt fair employment practice
laws, (2) to stimulate increased activity under state laws already in
existence, 2 and (3) to avoid duplicaton of effort by Federal and
local Fair Employment Practice Agencies. 30
An additional public policy ground for insuring that charging
party's Title VII rights are preserved is based on the fact that the
Supreme Court has decided that charges filed under Title VII do not
126. Blue Bell Boots, Inc., v. EEOC, 418 F.2d 355 (6th Cir. 1969); EEOC v. U.S. Fidelity
and Guarantee Co., 420 F. Supp. 244 (D. Md. 1976).
127. Choate v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 402 F.2d 357 (7th Cir. 1969); EEOC v. E. 1.
DuPont De Nemours and Co., 516 F.2d 1297 (3d Cir. 1975).
128. Lynn v. Western Gillette, Inc., 564 F.2d 1282 (9th Cir. 1977); De Mattels v. Kodak
Co., 520 F.2d 409 (2d Cir. 1974); Zambuto v. American Telephone and Telegraph Co., 544
F.2d 1333 (5th Cir. 1977); Wilson v. Sharon Steel Corp., 442 F. Supp. 231 (W.D. Pa. 1977),
vacated in part and remanded, 549 F.2d 726 (3d Cir. 1977).
129. BNA, THE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPoRTuNrrY AcT OF 1972, at 66 (1973).
130. 110 CONG. REc. 12,721-25 (1964), reprinted in EEOC, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TITLES
VII AND XI OF CIvIL RIGHTS AcT OF 1964, at 3003 (1970).
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toll rights under 42 U.S.C. section 1981.111 The import of this deci-
sion is that a charging party, whose charge has been delayed in
EEOC processing for several years, may lose his right under 42
U.S.C. section 1981.
In general, the courts have indicated an increased liberalization
in construction of section 1981 since the landmark decision of the
U.S. Supreme Court in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 13 which held
that section 1982, a companion section to section 1981, prohibited
private acts of racial discrimination. This trend toward liberal con-
struction of Civil Rights laws has caused a fundamental shift in the
position of courts in construing section 1981.'3 It seems obvious that
the trend is to construe Title VII in a similarly liberal fashion. In
addition to the circuit and district court cases aforementioned, the
Supreme Court's decision in Albermarble Paper Co. v. Moody 34
emphasized the fact that the purpose of Title VII is to make persons
whole for injuries suffered on account of employment discrimination
and that Congress took care to arm the courts with full equitable
powers.
Relatively recent Worksharing Agreements entered into between
the EEOC and State FEP Agencies have been recognized as offering
the FEP Agency the requisite opportunity to act as required by
Section 706(c).1' The validity of Worksharing Agreements has not
been reviewed by a single circuit court to date, and, in any case, the
problem of deferral is not the only one facing the courts in dealing
with the question of prerequisites to Title VII litigation. Equitable
extension of time as applied to tardy filing of charges is another area
in which the law is quickly evolving. 3 The courts appear to be
131. Guy v. Robins and Myers, 429 U.S. 229 (1976).
132. 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
133. 3 SANDS, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCION § 72.04 (4th ed. 1976); cf. Davis v.
United States Steel Supply Corp., 581 F.2d 335 (3d Cir. 1978) (court followed Pennsylvania's
six year statute of limitations applying to breach of contract actions rather than state's two
year statute of limitations for tort actions). See also Novotny v. Great American Savings &
Loan Association, 584 F.2d 1235 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. granted.
134. 422 U.S. 407 (1975). See also Craig v. Dept. of Health, Education and Welfare, 581
F.2d 189 (8th Cir. 1978).
135. EEOC v. Western States Machine Co., 17 Fair Empl. Prac Cases 1356 (S.D. Ohio
1978); Morgan v. Sharon, Pennsylvania Bd. of Educ., 445 F. Supp. 142 (W.D. Pa. 1978);
Stewart v. Charley Brothers Co., No. 78-1182 (W.D. Pa. December 19, 1978).
136. Webb v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 455 F. Supp. 821 (E.D. Pa. 1978); Reeb-v.
Economic Opportunity Atlanta, 516 F.2d 924 (5th Cir. 1975); Laffey v. Northwest Airlines,
13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cases 1068 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
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avoiding literalism in favor of a trend toward deriving the intent of
Congress in interpretation of Civil Rights laws in general, and hope-
fully this trend will continue, in order to prevent the loss of charging
parties' rights under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
